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As a result of the Christchurch Earthquake that occurred on 22nd February 2011 and the resultant loss of life 
and widespread damage, a Royal Commission of E'!quiry was conv~ned in April2011. The Royal Commission 
recommended a number of significant changes to the regulation of earthquake prone building in New Zealand. 
Earthquake prone buildings are buildings that are deemed to be of insufficient strength to perform adequately 
in a moderate earthquake. In response to the Royal Commission recommendations the New Zealand 
Government carried out a consultative process before announcing proposed changes to the building 
regulations in August 2013. One of the most significant changes is the imposition of mandatory strengthening 
requirements for earthquake prone buildings on a national basis. This will have a significant impact on the 
urban fabric of most New Zealand towns and cities. The type of traditional cost benefit study carried out to 
date fails to measure these impacts and this paper proposes an alternative methodology based on the analysis 
of land use data and rating valuations. This methodology was developed and applied to a small provincial 
town in the form of a case study. The results of this case study and the methodology used are discussed in this 
paper. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this research was to develop and test a method of measuring some of the likely social and 
economic impacts of the changes to the Building Act 2004 proposed by the New Zealand Government in 
response to the Christchurch earthquakes. The New Zealand Government is proposing to make it mandatory for 
the owners of earthquake prone buildings to either strengthen or demolish their buildings within 15 years of 
being identified as being earthquake prone. Earthquake prone buildings are defined as buildings that will have 
their ultimate capacity exceeded in the event of a moderate earthquake and are buildings with a seismic capacity 
ofless than 33% of new building standard (NBS). 
Earthquake mitigation measures such as seismic retrofitting of existing buildings are seen as a rational response 
to the risk posed by earthquakes. Evidence from past studies on hazard mitigation suggest that seismic 
retrofitting of earthquake prone buildings (EPBs) reduce loss oflife and property, disaster relief costs, business 
interruption, and social and environmental losses from an earthquake disaster (Nuti and Vanzi 2003, Rose eta/. 
2007). However, despite these benefits and the growth of the technical knowledge base on earthquake risk 
mitigation, property owners are often unwilling to retrofit their EPBs (Hopkins 2005). The unwillingness of 
owners of EPBs to retrofit their EPBs has been a critical issue in earthquake pre-disaster planning and 
management. Many factors such as cost, risk perception and efficacy of mitigation measures interact to 
influence seismic retrofit decisions (Egbelakin and Wilkinson 2010, Lindell and Prater 2000a). 
Studies in the social, economic and decision sciences have sought to address this dilemma from different 
perspectives. Many socio-psychologists have focused on the impact of risk perception on mitigation decisions, 
concluding that how people perceive and personalise earthquake risk significantly influences the types of 
protective decisions and behaviour adopted (Lepesteur et a/. 2008, Lindell and Prater 2000b, Lindell and Prater 
2002, Mulilis and Duvall995, Tierney eta/. 2001, Weinstein eta/. 1998). 
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Sociologists have studied the social aspects of earthquake risk mitigation. The idea that risk is essentially a 
cultural and social construct has been strongly argued by sociologists such as Douglas and Wildavsky (1982). 
As they put it "the measurement of risk is scientific, the acceptability of risk is political". The drive to reduce 
risk and make society safe is thus a phenomenon that has been the subject of a substantial body of research by 
sociologists. Sociologists have studied the way in which society has perceived and responded to risks through 
time and have shown how attitudes to risk have changed. In early times risks were perceived as something 
largely outside the control or understanding of man. Religion and superstition were central to the way people 
thought about and mitigated for risk. Risks were often seen as an act of god, fate or magic. Mitigation required 
rituals, sacrifices and religious observance. Elements of this attitude or world view can still be seen in societies 
that are deeply religious (Ghafory-Ashtiany, 2009) where a fatalistic attitude to earthquakes acts as an 
impediment to modem seismic mitigation. Starting with the age of enlightenment a new paradigm in terms of 
risk began to be accepted in western society. Risk came to be seen as a calculable mathematical probability that 
could be measured. The science of statistics was developed and has been applied to hazard assessment. Risks 
have become statistically predictable and therefore to some extent manageable with actuarial calculations 
providing a foundation on which to base insurance. The concept of risk also became increasingly important to 
the fmance discipline with Frank Knight establishing the important distinction between risk (which can be 
measured) and uncertainty (which is immeasurable). 
Recent research in New Zealand (Egbelakin and Wilkinson 2010, Egbelakin eta/. 2011) has looked at the 
importance ofbehavioural and social impediments to the successful implementation of earthquake mitigation. 
They found that although the level of awareness was high amongst building owners that were surveyed there 
was limited appetite for carrying out seismic retrofitting. Perceptions regarding high cost and low benefits 
relating to seismic retrofitting were impediments, as were a lack of trust and belief in seismic techniques and 
professionals. The influence of multiple stakeholders in the seismic mitigation decision making process was 
also found to be important. 
Researchers have also found that quality of risk information provided to owners, communication style, and 
characteristics of the agencies responsible for conveying this information affect building owners' willingness to 
adopt protective measures (Mileti and Fitzpatrick 1993, Mulilis and Lippa 1990, Pidgeon eta!. 2003, Tierney et 
a!. 2001). 
Economists have focussed on the fmancial viability of valuation decisions and policies regarding hazardous 
situations, providing a rationale on the overall economic benefits of implementing various mitigation measures 
(Bemknopf eta/. 1990, Cohen and Noll1981, Schulze eta/. 1987). Various studies on earthquake risk and 
property market prices found correlations between risks information and communication style, property values, 
location, government initiated policies and programs, house prices, investment decisions and owners' attitudes 
towards implementing mitigation measures (Beck et a/. 2002, Onder et al. 2004, Palm 1985, Palm 1987, Willis 
and Asgary 1997). 
Seismic retrofit decisions emphasised the reduction of the built environment's earthquake vulnerability (EERI 
1998), while property investment decisions are based on ensuring that an investor achieves a satisfactory return 
on his investments in the market place in form of an income flow or capital gain or a combination ofboth (Adair 
eta/. 1994). Arguably, various stakeholders, including property owners, investors, developers, occupiers, 
valuers, insurance and fmancial institutions, governmental agencies and hazard-related professionals contribute 
to property investment and earthquake risk mitigation decisions (Lindell eta/. 1997, Luke eta/. 20 10). These 
stakeholders operate at different levels in the public and private sectors, having varying impacts on building 
owner's risk mitigation decisions (Lindell et al. 1997). It is also clear is that there are a number of other 
stakeholders either influencing or affected by the seismic retrofit decision. The occupier of the building (if 
different to the owner) is interested in the use value and especially in matters affecting business productivity and 
operating costs such as appearance, comfort, safety and energy efficiency. The need for employers to provide a 
safe working environment for their employees under the Health and Safety in Employment Act may well drive 
potential occupiers away from earthquake-prone buildings. Most building occupiers are generally unaware of 
the property's seismic risks, unless issues regarding the building safety are raised (Butcher and Cooper 2004). 
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Losses from natural disasters can have a severe impact on an insurer's financial situation. An insurer may limit 
coverage in any given area or charges higher premiums in order to keep the likelihood of insolvency at an 
acceptable level (Lindell et al. 1997). 
The prevalence of similar stakeholders in property investment and seismic risk mitigation decisions suggests 
similarities and overlaps in both decision-making processes, such as making investment and retrofit decisions 
simultaneously at the time of purchase or construction. Other similarities include the impacts of real estate 
market conditions and level of uncertainty and risks associated with both decisions (As gary and Willis 1997). 
However, Bradley et al. (2008) explained that retrofit and investment decisions of existing buildings are usually 
considered individually, such that strengthening cost are not usually factored into property prices and 
investment decisions. Langston eta!. (2008) highlight the need for a transformation in the traditional decision-
making processes of property stakeholders towards more sustainable practices, strategies and outcomes. 
In dealing with the risk relating to earthquakes there is clearly a scientific element relating to the need to study a 
natural phenomenon. However, what is an acceptable level of risk for society is a subjective and political 
question. In order to aid policy development and insurance underwriting a large body of literature has been 
produced by experts in the fields of engineering, insurance, and economics. In particular a lot of effort has been 
put into improving the field of hazard assessment and various types of cost-benefit analysis (CBA). 
Earthquakes are low probability but high consequence events. The challenge of calculating the probability of 
earthquakes occurring and of then estimating their likely impact has received a lot of attention from both the 
insurance industry and earthquake engineers (Cardona et al. 2008a, Cardona et al. 2008b, Vanzi 2002, Bommer 
2002). 
In New Zealand a mathematical model was developed by Hopkins and Stuart (2003) which calculated the 
benefit-cost ratio for 32 cities and towns in New Zealand using 18 input variables. The methodology used in 
this paper was then recommended by central government to be used by Territorial Local Authorities (TLAs) 
when preparing their earthquake prone building policies as required by the Building Act 2004. Thus this paper is 
highly significant though it would appear that very few TLAs actually followed the methodology when 
preparing their earthquake-prone building policies. It is interesting to note that this paper identified that 
earthquake risk varies substantially around NZ and this resulted in benefit-cost ratios ranging from over 6 to .01 
-a ratio of 600 to 1. The paper concluded that account needs to be taken of the wide range of benefit-cost ratios 
in framing legislation governing earthquake risk buildings. This fmding is also confirmed by the work of 
Cousins (20 13) who calculated the probability of dying in an earthquake in different locations in New Zealand 
with high, medium or low seismic hazard. He concluded that there was more chance of dying in a compliant 
modem building in Wellington than in an un-strengthened URM building in Auckland and therefore that it is 
difficult to argue a case for blanket strengthening all old URM buildings in places of moderate to low seismic 
hazard. 
Any CBA is reliant on the gathering of accurate data and sound scientific assumptions. This is particularly the 
case for low probability but high consequence events such as earthquakes. A traditional CBA has been applied 
as part of the policy development undertaken by the New Zealand government. This CBA (Martin Jenkins, 
2012) calculated the present value of the benefits of strengthening which were then compared with the present 
value of the costs to arrive at the Net Present Value (NPV). The results of this study showed that the 
government proposals have a NPV of negative $1,680 million compared with the current 'status quo' which has 
a NPV of negative $933 million. The benefits were assessed as reduced building damage, and a reduced loss of 
life and injury. The analysis was done on a macro level with no attempt to split out the private and public 
components of the costs and benefits or to consider the costs and benefits on an individual building basis. 
Any attempt to carry out CBA on seismic retrofitting buildings in New Zealand is currently hamstrung by a lack 
of good data relating to existing building stock and the costs of retrofitting, There has been significant research 
done on building performance (Ingham and Griffith, 2011), and retrofitting techniques (Goodwin.et al, 2011), 
but basic information relating to earthquake strengthening costs is lacking in relation to New Zealand with the 
exception of some work done by Hare (Hare, 2009). Hare analysed the costs of seismic retrofitting a sample of 
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heritage buildings in Christchurch. The general lack of cost information was highlighted in the Royal 
Commission and appears to contrast with the situation in the USA where extensive research has been done by 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA, 1994). 
Cost benefit analysis tends to be on a macro level being either national, regional or city scale using methodology 
that looks at the total benefits and costs with no attempt to consider to whom the benefits accrue or who must 
bear the costs of the mitigation. 
While this may be useful in terms of the insurance industry and policy analysts it fails to address the benefit to 
cost ratio from a building owner perspective. For many owners this ratio is negative and is a major impediment 
to both voluntary and mandatory seismic retrofitting as discussed by Nahkies (Nahkies, 2009, Nahkies, 2013). 
Although this problem has been highlighted in the media, professional publications and submissions to the 
government review there remains a lack of empirically based academic research in this area. This paper 
attempts to gather empirical evidence on the feasibility of earthquake strengthening from the perspective of the 
owner using readily available public information in order to supplement information gained from more 
traditional CBA methods. 
METHODOLOGY 
In order to develop and test the method a case study approach was followed using the central commercial area of 
Waimate as the subject. The town ofWaimate was chosen as a case study example of a small provincial town 
in New Zealand typical of many others. Waimate is located in South Canterbury, in the South Island ofNew 
Zealand. The population in the Waimate urban area was assessed as 2,835 at the 2006 census. Early settlement 
in Waimate occurred in the 1870's and was based around the saw milling industry which utilised the nearby 
native forest and supplied the growing towns of Timaru and Oamaru. Over time the economy diversified into 
that of a typical provincial rural service town similar to many scattered throughout New Zealand. 
The town suffered an economic downturn in the 1980's with the closure ofthe dairy factory and a number of 
sawmills. Recovery from this down turn has been slow and patchy with other economic setbacks occurring such 
as the closure of two furniture manufacturers and a vegetable processing plant early this century. However, 
there has been some recovery over the last 10 years as the local dairy farming industry has increased in 
significance. 
A legacy of the comparatively prosperous early history is the significant number of substantial unreinforced 
masonry buildings that still line Queen Street, which is the main street ofWaimate. The early prosperity was 
followed by a long period of limited economic growth. As a result there has been little building of 'new' 
commercial buildings in Waimate over the last 50 years with the following exceptions: 
• BNZ bank building (1975) 
• Council building (1982) 
• Police Station (1996) 
• Industrial warehouse (1997) 
• Supermarket (1997) 
As a result the main street of Waimate is still largely original in terms of its building stock and architectural 
appearance. This gives Queen Street a distinct Victorian and Edwardian ambience that is valued by residents 
and tourists alike. A "Historic Walk" brochure is published by the Waimate Information Centre which describes 
37 historical items or buildings, many of them located in Queen Street. 
Under current legislation all local authorities in New Zealand must have a policy prepared under section 131 of 
the Building Act 2004 setting out how the local authority manages the earthquake prone building problem in 
their jurisdiction. The current Waimate Earthquake-prone, Dangerous and Insanitary Buildings Policy was 
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formally adopted by the Council on 191h September 2006. The policy was reviewed in 2012 with the original 
policy left unchanged but with a proviso that it would be reviewed again once the results of the Royal 
commission became apparent. 
The Waimate policy is a "passive" approach where seismic assessments and structural upgrades are triggered by 
an application for a change of use. The Council may also assess a building if application is made for building 
alterations, extension of life or when a complaint is received. Due to the lack ofbuilding activity occurring in 
the central area this has meant that little or no earthquake strengthening has been 'triggered' since the policy has 
been in effect. Only one shop has had some structural strengthening carried out. 
Once identified as an earthquake prone building the upgrade time frame varies from 15 to 25 years depending 
on the existing strength of the building. Weaker buildings below 20% ofNew Building Standard (NBS) are 
given 15 years while those that are 25-32% ofNBS have 25 years to carry out the strengthening work. 
Due to the passive approach taken by the Council towards earthquake prone buildings and the limited economic 
growth occurring in the town there has been little activity in the form of either seismic strengthening or 
demolition and redevelopment. The government proposal to introduce mandatory strengthening will therefore 
be a significant change impacting on the property market and land use in Waimate. 
While traditional CBA analysis has a place it is unable to provide useful information in terms of measuring the 
micro economic impacts on individual property owners. Seismic retrofitting is a form of property development 
and as such, alternative models ofCBA are necessary to shed light on the likely impacts and subsequent 
investment decisions made by individual owners. These models based around the private financial costs and 
benefits to the private property owner typically take the form of a feasibility study where the legally permissible, 
physically possible and financially viable alternatives are considered. 
The building owner served notice to strengthen or demolish under the proposed legislation effectively has four 
options to consider: 
1. Seismic retrofit: Strengthen the building to 34%ofNBS, 
2. Conversion: Undertake a Change of Use and strengthen the buildings as near as reasonably practicable 
to NBS while fmding a different use for the buildings. 
3. Demolish and Redevelop: Clear the site and build a replacement building. 
4. Demolish with no redevelopment. The owner clears the site and then either holds the site for future 
redevelopment or alternatively tries to sell the site. 
Which ofthese options will be chosen by the owner will depend on their specific resources and their particular 
attitude, values and objectives. Of concern to the communities that will be impacted by the policies is the 
proportion of earthquake prone buildings that will be demolished as opposed to being strengthened. If large 
numbers of buildings are demolished then effectively it will be like "having an earthquake without the 
earthquake" as was stated by the Waitaki District Council chief executive Michael Ross (Littlewood, 2012). 
Clearly in the event of a 'regulatory earthquake' there will not be any loss of life or injury as would occur in a 
severe physical earthquake but the fmancial impacts on owners and communities are likely to be more damaging 
as there will not be any insurance money to fund any rebuild. The impacts on land use, heritage, local 
economies, and communities will be significant. 
In order to accurately estimate the likely number of demolitions individual feasibility studies would be required 
on each earthquake prone building along with interviews with their owners to establish their likely response to 
their individual circumstances. This is clearly not a practical option for local authorities. As an alternative the 
methodology described in this paper was developed and tested using Waimate as a case study. Land use and 
valuation data was purchased from Quotable Value for all commercial property in the Waimate District Council 
area. Basic financial analysis was then carried out to try and identify those suspected earthquake prone 
buildings that were likely to be at risk of demolition if faced with mandatory earthquake strengthening. 
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From the land use data obtained from QV the central commercial area ofWaimate was identified and split out as 
a separate study area. Using the Waimate District Council Operative District Plan as a basis the central business 
district (CBD) ofWaimate was defined as the mix of"Business 1" zoned properties and the "Business 2" zoned 
properties clustered in and around the Queen Street precinct. The Business 1 (B 1) zone comprises Queen Street 
itself with a strong emphasis on retail activity. The Business 2 (B2) zone is described as a "Mixed Business Use 
Area" surrounding Queen Street and allows for a mixture of commercial, service, industrial and residential 
activities. Initially all buildings in the B 1 and B2 zones were considered for analysis but then any building not 
subject to earthquake-prone building policies such as residential houses were excluded from the sample. Vacant 
land once identified was also excluded from the analysis leaving a final pool of 80 commercial buildings located 
in the Waimate CBD that are likely to be 'caught' by earthquake prone building regulation. Refer to Figure 1 
below. 
FIGURE 1. Commercial Zoning Plan from the Waimate District Plan. 
To aid in this study it was necessary to try and identify the number of buildings in the Waimate central business 
district (CBD) that would be considered earthquake prone. This was necessary as Waimate. District Council has 
not yet prepared a register of earthquake-prone buildings. Buildings constructed prior to 1976 are typically 
considered to have the potential to be earthquake-prone. Buildings constructed after 1976 were required to meet 
more stringent building regulations and are unlikely to be earthquake-prone unless they suffer from design 
flaws creating what are known as critical structure weaknesses. For the purpose of the study earthquake-prone 
buildings were defined as those buildings built before the 1950's ofunreinforced masonry (URM) and which 
had not been significantly earthquake strengthened. 
The age of buildings were initially obtained using the land use data purchased from Quotable Value for the 
study area. However it was found that for many of the buildings the age was described as "mixed" as later 
additions had been made to the original building. These additions were often of a comparatively minor nature 
with the principal building clearly falling within the type and age of building that would constitute an 
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earthquake prone building. As a result this 'raw' land use data was audited and augmented by curb side field 
inspections over a two day period in February 2013. These curb side inspections were also supplemented by the 
use of aerial photographs viewed on "Google Earth" to help identify the different parts ofbuildings that were 
'modem' where the land use data assessed buildings as being of mixed age. No attempt was made to enter the 
properties or to carry out any internal inspections of buildings. 
Interviews were also undertaken with the building consents and regulatory staff ofWaimate District Council to 
confirm what new construction and retrofitting had taken place in the town. Interviews were also undertaken 
with local real estate professionals to gather background information on the commercial property market in 
Waimate. 
In carrying out the economic analysis the rating valuations were used as a proxy for market values. Due to the 
passive nature of the Waimate Earthquake- prone Buildings Policy there was little market concern regarding 
seismic building capacity prior to the Christchurch earthquakes. Therefore the cost and liability of compulsory 
earthquake strengthening is not priced into the market in terms ofthe 2010 values and there is little danger of 
double counting these costs in the economic analysis undertaken. Sales evidence relating to the study area was 
also examined but is very limited in nature making it difficult to draw conclusions regarding value changes post 
the earthquakes. For example only three property sales were recorded in the study area for the whole of20 12. 
Two sold above their 2010 rateable value while one sold below. It is unclear as to what extent the potential for 
mandatory strengthening and/or the impact of the Christchurch earthquakes is being factored into recent 
commercial property sales in Waimate. 
The costs of earthquake strengthening were calculated based on $400 m2 as an average figure. This is slightly 
higher than the $300 m2 used in the Martin Jenkins CBA but this sum does not allow for non-structural costs of 
retrofitting which can be substantial. It was therefore considered prudent to increase the estimate for 
strengthening costs to $400 m2 to make some allowance for the non-structural costs likely to be incurred. 
Demolition costs were estimated at $180m2 based on the analysis ofthe actual demolition costs of a small URM 
building in Christchurch. This was checked against Rawlinsons New Zealand Construction Handbook which 
provides a figure of$152 m2 • Rawlinsons notes that demolition costs vary considerably depending on a number 
of factors and that a quote from a demolition contractor is advisable. 
A comparison was made between existing values, as represented by the rating valuations and the costs of 
complying with the government proposals in terms of either strengthening or demolishing buildings. No 
attempt was made to allow for time delays in the completion of the demolition or strengthening work in the form 
of present value analysis. 
For each building analysed the estimated costs of strengthening were deducted from the estimated value ofthe 
un-strengthened building. Where this resulted in a negative building 'value' then the existing value ofthe 
property would be reduced below the unencumbered land value. The costs of demolition were also estimated 
for each building and these demolition costs were then deducted from the estimate ofland value to arrive at the 
redevelopment value of the building site. By looking at both these different values it is then possible to predict 
the likely option that would be taken by the owner forced to make a decision on their buildings due to 
legislation. Where the existing use value is higher than the redevelopment value than the highest and best use 
of the property is to retain and strengthen. Where this value is less than the redevelopment value then the highest 
and best use is to demolish the building. 
The extent to which building owners choose the option to demolish rather than retrofit will potentially be 
affected by the impact of heritage protection on their buildings. The extent to which earthquake strengthening 
requirements under the Building Act 'trumps' the heritage protection objectives of the Resource Management 
Act is an area of developing case law. A recent decision by the Environment Court regarding the Harcourts 
Building in Wellington would indicate that heritage protection is still a significant factor to be considered. 
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The current Waimate District Plan recognises the amenity and heritage value of the existing building stock and 
street scene. It seeks to maintain this by the use of heritage protection rules. There are also building design 
controls over new and existing non-heritage buildings which were introduced in response to some of the more 
recent developments which were unsympathetic to the streetscape. 
Section 8 of the current District Plan deals specifically with heritage protection. Under this section heritage 
items are identified in the District Plan as either Category A, B or C. The demolition or removal of a Category 
A item is a Non-complying Activity. For Category B items any demolition, removal, alteration or addition is a 
Discretionary Activity. For Category C items demolition or removal is a permitted activity while alterations or 
additions are a controlled activity. 
This means that effectively there is no legal impediment to an owner demolishing a category C building. There 
is a requirement to delay any demolition for 3 months to allow a chance for alternatives to be explored. 
Photographs must also be taken. 
There are a total of 135 heritage items listed in the District Plan. Of these 23 (17%) are Category A, 22 (16%) 
are Category Band 90 (67%) are Category C. Within the study area there are 46 listed buildings. One building 
is Category A (2%), two are Category B (4%) and the other 43 (94%) are Category C. Thus the great majority 
of heritage buildings in the study area can be demolished as of right and have little effective protection. Thus 
the decisions of the owners are expected to hinge around the economic impacts of the mandatory earthquake 
strengthening rather than heritage protection rules. 
RESULTS OF STUDY 
The current 201 0 rating values are considered to be untainted by the impacts of either the Christchurch 
earthquakes or the resultant market corrections evident in many parts ofthe country. Any prudent purchaser 
expecting to be forced to earthquake strengthen their building under the current government proposals would 
therefore deduct the cost of the strengthening work from the current value. 
A large proportion of the Waimate central business district is highly likely to be earthquake prone. This is 
summarised in the following Table. 
Table 1. Analysis ofWaimate Commercial Buildings 
Likely Seismic Bl Zoning % B2 Zoning % Bl &B2 0/o 
Status Only Only Combined 
Earthquake-prone 43 90 16 50 59 74 
Complying 5 10 16 50 21 26 
Totals 48 100 32 100 80 100 
Of the total of85 properties analysed there were 5 that were vacant. Ofthe remaining properties it was 
considered that 59 (74%) out of the 80 contained suspected earthquake prone buildings. In terms of floor area it 
was estimated that approximately 24819 square metres of building would likely require strengthening or 
demolition. Based on a strengthening cost of$400m2 to bring the buildings above 33.33% ofNBS this equates 
to a total cost of$9,927,440 dollars. On an aggregate basis the total rateable value of the buildings is only 
$6,082,000. Therefore the cost to strengthen the buildings exceeds their current value by $3,845,440. 
On an individual building basis 46 (78%) out of the 59 suspected earthquake prone buildings have no residual 
building value once strengthening costs are deducted. Thus the impact of the government proposals would be to 
wipe out any economic value currently accruing to most of the existing buildings in the central business district. 
The impact of the government proposals regarding earthquake prone buildings will effectively give many ofthe 
buildings a hypothetical negative value. 
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If just the B 1 zone which largely comprises the Queen Street properties which go to make up the main street of 
the town is considered then the situation is even worse. Of the 48 properties making up this zone 43 comprise 
earthquake prone buildings. This means that approximately 90% of the main retail and service centre for the 
district would be considered earthquake prone. 
Where an owner has an earthquake prone building with a negative value they may then attempt to limit their 
losses by choosing to demolish rather than strengthen. However, this means that the owner will incur a 
demolition cost which will reduce the net worth of their site. In extreme situations ifthe land value is low and 
demolition costs are high you can conceivably have the situation of negative land values. This is the situation 
for some sites in Waimate as the commercial land values are low. The rateable values for commercial land 
varies from between $41m2 and $171m2 • The variation in land values is due to the large number of variables 
typically impacting on land values such as location, shape, access, frontage, size and zoning. The average land 
value calculated for the sites being studied is $83m2 • 
If large scale demolition occurs as predicted, this may lead to a secondary impact on land values. The supply of 
commercial land will considerably outstrip the demand for redevelopment and may drive commercial land 
values even lower. 
Having identified that a large proportion ofthe buildings in Waimate are earthquake prone an estimate was 
made of the number of buildings where the owner might choose to demolish the buildings. This is difficult to 
do without interviewing the individual owners as their decisions will vary widely depending on the resources, 
attitudes and objectives ofthe owner. 
The building owner served notice to strengthen or demolish under the current government proposals effectively 
has the four options of either a seismic retrofit with no change of use, a seismic retrofit with a change of use, to 
demolish and redevelop, or to demolish and not redevelop. 
For the owner of a typical URM commercial building in Waimate all four options are problematic as the 
following examples illustrate. The examples are based on a hypothetical, but typical main street property in 
Waimate that closely approximates a number of actual buildings in terms of construction, age and size. The 
building is a two storey URM building. It has a floor area of750 square metres and is on a section of 700m2 in 
the Business 1 Zone with frontage to Queen Street. Based on a cost of $400m2 to strengthen to 34 %NBS the 
strengthening costs would be $300,000. The cost of demolition has been estimated at $180 m2 or $135,000. 
Property values are based on the level of values applied in the 2010 Rating Valuations. 
Option 1 - Seismic retrofit 
Current Value of Building $140,000 
Current Land Value $90,000 
Current Value of Property $230,000 
Less costs of strengthening $300,000 
Existing Use Value of property -$70,000 
After deducting the costs of earthquake strengthening from the value of the buildings the buildings then have a 
negative value of -$160,000. This negative value exceeds both the current land value and building value. It 
would therefore indicate that the current existing use value of the property assuming a compulsory seismic 
retrofit would be negative $70,000. 
It could be argued that a degree of"betterment' will occur with the retrofitted building, however this is likely to 
be limited due to the difficulty of attracting any enhanced investment returns. In addition a conservative cost of 
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strengthening has been used which takes limited account of the indirect costs of earthquake strengthening or 
consequential costs relating to frre safety and disabled access and facilities upgrades. These could both add 
substantially more to the strengthening costs as calculated previously. 
Option 2- Conversion to an Alternative Use 
The building is currently subdivided into several shops and it unlikely that an alternative use will generate 
higher returns than currently available. In large cities such as Auckland and Wellington there is often potential 
to do this as obsolete office space can be converted to apartments due to the demand for inner city living. There 
is no such potential in Waimate. 
A challenge of any building conversion is that the costs of conversion are considerably higher due to the 
requirements of section 115 of the Building Act. The costs of earthquake strengthening alone triggered by a 
change of use can be considerably higher as the building must be bought up to a level as near as reasonably 
practicable to that of a new building. This is often interpreted to be a level that is at least 66.66% of NBS. 
The added cost of going to 66.66% of NBS will vary on a case by case basis however a study done by John Hare 
(Hare, 2009) of Holmes Consulting found that on average the cost increased by an average of2.5 times that of 
33.33%. This would increase strengthening costs to a rate of$1,000m2 and costs of strengthening the building 
to $750,000. 
Option 3 - Demolition and Redevelopment 
Assuming the owner elects to demolish their building and in the absence of any salvage value of materials then 
the fmancial situation of the owner will be as follows. 
Land Value $ 90,000 
Less costs of demolition $ 135,000 
Redevelopment Value of property -$ 45,000 
The owner would clearly have a number of challenges not the least being that his capital asset of $230,000 is 
now a liability of$45,000. He may now have considerable negative equity in the property but must also attempt 
to raise the money necessary to build a replacement building. He also has the problem offmding tenants for his 
new building as his existing displaced tenants may be unwilling to wait for the replacement building to be built, 
They may also be unable or unwilling to pay the higher rent necessary to make a new building financially 
feasible. 
The buildings in the study area house a large number of businesses and also contain some residential 
accommodation. At best these businesses and residents would need to relocate to alternative space while 
strengthening took place. In the event of demolition, this displacement may become permanent for many of the 
businesses. The building owner will not replace their demolished building unless they can obtain a reasonable 
return on the capital invested in their replacement building. This is likely to cause severe affordability issues for 
the displaced tenants. 
Current rents appear to be in the order of approximately $100m2 gross rent. If the owner wished to get a 
return of 10% on a replacement building cost of $2000 per square metre they would need to get $200 m2 net of 
expenses. This excludes any allowance for a return on the land value. It is therefore likely that replacement 
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buildings will need to be rented at double the amount of current rents. Many tenants will be unable to afford to 
pay double their existing rents. 
Option 4 - Demolition with no rebuild. 
This is a more likely scenario than Option 3 as the owner is unlikely to have the knowledge, experience or 
confidence necessary to undertake the role of property developer as required by Option 3. In larger more 
prosperous towns vacant sites can often be put to an alternative "interim use" such as car parking to off-set 
holding costs. This is unlikely in Waimate and the number of new development sites is likely to 'flood' the 
local market. 
As the above examples illustrate the owner is faced with a difficult decision as none of the options are 
economically feasible. His best option is to abandon the property completely although this option is not legally 
possible as under current and proposed legislation the Council has the power to have the building demolished 
and then recover the costs from the owner. 
On the figures presented above the highest and best use is to demolish the building as the value as a 
redevelopment site of- $45,000 is higher than the existing use value of -$70,000. Thus the fmancialloss from 
demolition will be slightly less than the retrofit option. Either way the owner will suffer a serious financial 
setback which may cause hardship. 
Clearly the results of the various options are highly sensitive to the levels of costs and values used. If lower 
demolition costs or strengthening costs are assumed then either one or other of the options may become 
relatively more 'attractive' to the owner. However, it is highly unlikely that any of them will become 
financially feasible for the owners. 
Current analysis shows that of the 59 suspected earthquake-prone properties, 26 will show a negative value 
regardless ofthe option chosen. This means they are a fmancialliability rather than an asset regardless of 
whether the owner chooses to strengthen or demolish. 
Out of the 59 properties in 26 cases (44%) the best financial result can be achieved by demolition and on pure 
economic grounds this is the option that would be expected of the owner. Of note however, is that in 46 cases 
out of 59 the cost of strengthening is likely to exceed or equal the current value of the buildings. This means 
that 78% ofthe buildings would appear to have no economic value once the costs of earthquake strengthening 
are deducted and are therefore in some danger of demolition. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper proposes the use of a feasibility based cost benefit analysis conducted on a building by building basis 
utilising readily available land use data and rating valuations from QV. The method was tested using a small 
rural town as a case study. This case study analysis was useful in testing the accuracy and relevance of the data 
and highlighted a number of issues. 
While the QV data provided good base information it suffers from a number of limitations in terms of a study of 
this type. The information is based on the information contained in the rating roll. Therefore information is 
collected for each separately defmed Rating Unit. Such a rating unit may contain several different buildings or 
may include only part of a building. This creates difficulties in using the data for a building by building 
analysis. 
Information on the age of the buildings is included but where there have been additions or alterations carried out 
then the age is given as "mixed". When there are multiple buildings of differing age forming a rating unit then 
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the age is also described as mixed. This makes the data less useful in terms of identifying earthquake prone 
buildings. The Martin Jenkins CBA found similar problems using QV data as they found on a national basis 
that 41% of the buildings were age unknown. 
In order to improve the usefulness of the raw QV data requires auditing of various types such as field inspection, 
inspection of building files or use of photographic records. Such auditing processes add time and cost to the 
process. 
A study of this type must assess the seismic capacity of the commercial building stock. In order to do this 
accurately would require significant expert engineering input which was not available for this study. Instead 
reliance was placed on a basic analysis or the age and construction of the buildings to identify those likely to be 
earthquake prone. This lack of engineering data is a limitation of this study but eventually accurate lists of 
earthquake prone buildings compiled by T.As will be able to be used to supplement QV land use data thus 
making it unnecessary to estimate the numbers of earthquake prone buildings. However, the list of earthquake-
prone buildings will still need to be matched with the land use data in relation to floor areas and building values. 
Future studies of this nature may also have problems in terms of using rating valuations as a proxy for the 
market values of the buildings in their pre strengthened state as these valuations may include a value discount to 
reflect their low seismic capacity. If the cost of seismic retrofitting is deducted from these already discounted 
values then the costs of earthquake strengthening will effectively be double counted leading to incorrect results. 
The economic analysis in this study by necessity is crude, with no attempt made to use discounting techniques to 
arrive at net present values for costs and benefits. For the case study, market analysis was also limited with no 
attempt made to quantify any betterment accruing to owners from earthquake strengthening. 
However, despite the limitations of the methodology developed and tested in Waimate it does have some 
advantages. It is comparatively simple and cost effective and provides information that should be valuable to land 
use planners and policy analysts. For example, for this particular case study it would indicate that a significant 
proportion of the commercial building stock in Waimate is at risk of demolition given the proposed legislative 
changes. These changes have the potential to cause a sharp market correction in the value of any buildings 
considered earthquake prone. These buildings will likely suffer a significant drop in value that may render them 
economically obsolete and thus result in their demolition. 
For towns such as Waimate where earthquake prone buildings represent a significant portion of the building stock, 
the economic and social impacts will be severe. Owners and tenants will suffer displacement which at best will 
be temporary but this displacement may become permanent where tenants cannot afford rent increases. Those 
tenants that can meet the rent increases necessary for new buildings are likely to protect their profit margins by 
passing on the increased rents to their customers. Ultimately the rental increases then become a cost to the 
community 
It is highly likely that if owners are forced to take action on their buildings over a comparatively short time frame 
as per the government proposals that potentially 50% of the buildings in the study area could be demolished This 
compares with an estimate in the Martin Jenkins CBA of 10% which is "judgement based" rather than empirically 
based. The situation is likely to be exacerbated by the fact that most if not all of the owners will lack development 
experience and skills. Based on the analysis, any equity that owners have in their properties is liable to be severely 
eroded which will make it difficult to raise fmance. Difficulties with insuring their retrofitted buildings may also 
impact negatively on the value of their property which may also reduce the feasibility of retrofitting. 
Many of these buildings facing demolition will be heritage buildings. As discussed earlier the great majority of 
buildings have very limited heritage protection even iflisted as having heritage value in the district plan. Of the 
59 suspected earthquake prone buildings in the study area a total of 45 (76%) are heritage listed. Of the 45 only 
1 is Category A, 3 are Category B and the balance are Category C. Demolition of Category C buildings is a 
permitted activity so over 90% of the heritage buildings are at risk of demolition. All the heritage listed buildings 
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in the study area are likely to be earthquake-prone and as the previous economic analysis shows are probably 
uneconomic to earthquake strengthen. Large numbers of heritage buildings are likely to be demolished and not 
replaced. This will leave significant gaps in the street scene and destroy much of the current heritage value of 
Queen Street. 
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